African Centre for Justice and Peace Studies ACJPS | المركز الافريقي لدراسات العدالة و السلام
14 November 2023
There have been significant developments on both the political and the human rights levels in Sudan during the past couple of months. In particular, the past few weeks have witnessed movements by the Rapid Support Forces to focus on the Darfur region, with the aim of using this region as a strategic military base from which it can bring about a change in the balance of military and political power.
On 28 October 2023, the Rapid Support Forces announced their seizure of the city of Nyala in South Darfur State, after the military forces of the 16th Division of the Sudanese Army withdrew from the city. Accordingly, the Commander of the Rapid Support Forces appointed a police commander and called for the courts and the Public Prosecutor’s Office to continue their legal work according to the usual daily routine. Security fragility is still prevalent in the city of Nyala, where three people were killed in the Khartoum neighbourhood by gunmen on November 5, 2023. There continues to be a very heavy stench of decomposing bodies inside the Grand Market in Nyala, as a result remains of bodies of fighters from both sides and civilian victims as a result of the armed confrontations around the army headquarters.
In a related context, on 4 November 2023, the Rapid Support Forces announced control of the 15th Division of the Sudanese Army in El Geneina, West Darfur State. Rapid Support Commander Abdul Rahim Dagalo called on both the police and judicial institutions to carry out their duties as usual. He called on merchants to reopen their stores and also appealed to humanitarian organizations to provide assistance to citizens. He also announced the appointment of Major General Abdel Rahman Jumaa, who is subject to US sanctions, as commander of the Army’s 15th Division in the city of El Geneina, in addition to the continuation of the designated governor of the state in performing his duties.
The city of El Geneina, which has fragile security, has witnessed the killing of Al-Farsha Muhammad Arbab, one of the pillars of the civil administration of the Masalit tribe in Western Darfur, and the Rapid Support Forces have been accused of committing this crime. On 4 November, a native administration man was assassinated along with his son and eight of his grandchildren after the Rapid Support Forces stormed the homes of citizens in the Ardamta locality.
In Central Darfur state, on Tuesday, 31 October 2023, armed militias invaded the Hasahisa IDP Camp in Zalingei after the Rapid Support Forces took control of the headquarters of the army’s 21st Division in the city of Zalingei. Some human rights activists have revealed that dozens were killed and 24 cases of rape occurred in the Al-Hasahisa IDP camp during repeated attacks since the first of October, with widespread looting, burning, and assaults increasing. Activists pointed out that a large number of camp residents were displaced due to the attack of the Saraf Umra areas, and some of them at he city of Zalingei and the Hamidiya camp, while the fate of a large number of families was not known. The Rapid Support Forces imposed a tight siege on the Al-Hasahisa camp for weeks under the pretext that army personnel obtained food and water from the camp, before the siege was partially lifted on Tuesday, 31 October, coinciding with the Rapid Support Forces’ control of the 21st Division of the Sudanese army.
Through the Rapid Support’s control over the Darfur region, in addition to the gold resources, most of whose mines are under the jurisdiction of the Rapid Support Forces, seizing the state of South Darfur means controlling the Arabic resource, and the enormous livestock wealth available in this state. Therefore, on the political level, the Rapid Support Forces has a geographical area in Darfur, financial resources and tribal support from ethnic groups, the majority of whom have ethnic similarities, in addition to relations with the African Sahel region, which provide it with support in multiple forms.
In light of these developments, the negotiating position of Rapid Support Forces at the political level may be stronger than before, leading to a change in the balance of power in the Jeddah Forum held under American-Saudi mediation.
These developments may prolong the negotiations for a permanent ceasefire especially if the two parties to the war in Sudan have resumed the anticipated new round of negotiations on Thursday, November 2 in the Saudi city of Jeddah, through military escalation and intensifying armed bombardment between the army and the Rapid Support Forces. Some activists reported that “a number of areas in the north of the city of Omdurman were subjected to severe artillery shelling, via shells fired from sites where there are Rapid Support Forces in the Bahri area.”
During the time when the Rapid Support Forces were active in Darfur for the past few weeks, the Sudanese army intensified its aerial bombardment and targeted “Rapid Support” assembly centres in several locations in the three cities of the capital, “Khartoum, Bahri, and Omdurman.” Despite the military and political escalation, the Sudanese army announced last week that it had received an invitation to resume the “Jeddah” negotiations, confirming the participation of its delegation in the meetings, as did the leaders of the Rapid Support Forces. The “Forces of Freedom and Change” also called for unifying the regional initiatives proposed to resolve the crisis in Sudan, to support the path of the “Jeddah Platform” as “the only option” available to both sides of the fighting to stop the war.
On the 29th of last October, a joint statement was issued by Saudi Arabia, the United States of America, the Intergovernmental Authority for Development (IGAD) and the African Union, regarding a new round of talks between the parties (the armed forces and the Rapid Support Forces), and the “facilitators” limited the negotiation items to three. Axes; facilitating the delivery of humanitarian aid, achieving a ceasefire, confidence-building measures and the possibility of achieving a permanent cessation of hostilities, and then refraining from dealing with any issues of a political nature during the confidence-building phase.
On 7 November, the last round of Jeddah talks between the Sudanese Armed Forces and the Rapid Support Forces were concluded, despite that the talks moving forward, have not been implemented to cease fire ceasefire for a long or short period.
The Saudi Ministry of Foreign Affairs statement about the talks indicated the commitment of both parties to the fighting to facilitate the passage of humanitarian aid to civilians trapped by the fighting. However, this commitment is merely a repetition of what was signed six months ago in the Jeddah Agreement on May 11, which included seven clauses that focused on facilitating the delivery of humanitarian aid to civilians and their protection, and also focused on the two parties’ commitment to international humanitarian law and human rights law.
It is true that the statement indicated that the two parties have agreed to engage in a joint humanitarian mechanism led by the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs to address obstacles to the delivery of relief aid, and about identifying contact points to facilitate the passage of humanitarian and aid workers, and about establishing a communication mechanism between the two warring parties, but all of that will be difficult to achieve on the ground, in light of the lack of a ceasefire and the increasing intensity of battles, in the absence of internationally known mechanisms to create safe and protected corridors to facilitate the arrival of humanitarian aid to civilians.
The past few days also witnessed movements in the corridors of the African Union and, The Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) during which multiple consultations were held with the various Sudanese political blocs in the Egyptian capital, Cairo, in accordance with a new vision for a comprehensive political process , that does not intersect with the course of the negotiations in Jeddah or at least as those responsible for these parallel movements said.
Despite the integration or intersection of all these political initiatives at the national, regional and international levels to resolve the crisis in Sudan, what matters to the civilian population, especially in the Darfur region, is preventing the effects of war and alleviating its devastating repercussions. This goal can only be achieved through a permanent cessation of hostilities, opening safe corridors for the delivery of humanitarian aid, and paving the way for a comprehensive peace process through which the civilian population can return from places of asylum and displacement to their areas of origin and work to restore the path of the civil state and democratic transformation.
Mossaad Mohamed Ali
Executive Director
African Centre for Justice and Peace Studies (ACJPS)
